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EASTERN ENLARGEMENT AND THE  
EUROPEAN UNION’S SECURITY AGENDA 
 
  
 
 
At the end of the Cold War the security threats facing Europe underwent a dramatic change.  
With the virtual implausibility of interstate military conflicts came an increased risk of 
enthonationalist violence, as exemplified by the wars in the former Yugoslavia, organized crime, 
terrorism, and immigration, among others.  The attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United 
States further transformed the global security context, effectively making the obliteration of 
international terrorism the primary US foreign and domestic policy goal.  The intensification of 
the efforts to combat terrorism further underscored the indivisibility of the European Union’s 
internal and external security and gave rise to a renewed debate on the Union’s global voice. 
 
At the same time, the European Union is embarking upon one of the most challenging 
and momentous enterprises of its history - enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta.  The accession of ten new member states will 
inevitably change the size and shape of the EU and influence its decision-making processes as 
well as increase the range of issues brought to the table, including common foreign and security 
policies.   
 
This paper will look at some issues that play an important part in the security agenda of 
the European Union and its member states and will outline some of the potential challenges the 
eastern enlargement poses in these areas.  It will argue that the securitization of immigration 
from Central and Eastern Europe has occurred mainly along the dimensions of labor migration 
and organized crime as a danger for the socioeconomic welfare of West European societies in 
general.  The focus on combating terrorism, while vitally important, necessitates continuing 
cooperation with the accession countries in the efforts to strengthen their porous borders, without 
creating new lines of division on the continent.  While the new members are likely to contribute 
to the formulation of more Atlanticist foreign and security policies, a convergence between the 
interests of the current and new member states is likely to occur, thereby strengthening the 
European Union’s voice in global affairs.   
 
The paper is divided into two broad sections, the first one of which deals with the 
“softer” security issue of immigration and the threats it presents to the public order in the 
European Union in terms of competition for scarce jobs, organized crime, and terrorism as a key 
security threat.  The second section addresses the state of common European foreign and security 
policies in the aftermath of the war with Iraq and the impact of enlargement on their scope and 
effectiveness, as well as on the transatlantic relationship.   
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Societal Security in the EU and Enlargement 
 
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the security field was transformed to include issues 
ranging from large-scale violence and civil wars to small-scale guerrilla conflicts, ethnic 
violence, international terrorism, organized crime, drug- and human trafficking, and illegal 
immigration, among others.  The broader definition of security included perceptions of threats to 
the state as well as the society and the individual.  Threats to state and society in particular have 
taken on a new importance since the attacks in Washington and New York on Sept. 11.  These 
events led to the establishment of homeland security as the primary domestic and foreign policy 
goal of the United States, resulting in the “war on terror,” which now headlines the international 
security agenda.  In the European Union, the tenuous line between internal and external security 
had become ever more blurry in the 1990s.  Internal security came to encompass a number of 
issues, including terrorism, drug-trafficking, organized crime and illegal immigration, which now 
dominate international security.  With regards to the eastern enlargement, many of these issues 
come together as they are some times represented as being introduced in the European Union 
through the migration flows from the East.   
 
The removal of internal borders within the EU put a renewed emphasis on the policing of 
the external borders of the Union and placed migration firmly into the national security 
frameworks of the member states.  Portrayed as a root cause of perceived threats to economic 
well-being, social and political order, and cultural and religious identities, migration is 
securitized as an existential threat to society, thereby justifying the need to take extraordinary 
measures to protect it.  Some of the earliest examples of securitization of migration can be found 
throughout the text of the Schengen Agreement.  For example, Title 1, Art. 7, provides for the 
approximation of the signatories’ visa policies as soon as possible “in order to avoid the adverse 
consequences in the field of immigration and security that may result from easing checks at the 
common borders,” and the application of visa and admission procedures “taking into account the 
need to ensure the protection of the entire territory of the five States against illegal immigration 
and activities that could jeopardize security.”
1  The 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen 
Agreement also connects migration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime, and border 
control, and locates it in a framework regulating the security of the internal market.
2  Most 
recently, Javier Solana, High Representative of the EU for CFSP, recently stated in a speech to 
the European Parliament that, ”massive flow of drugs and migrants are coming to Europe and 
affect its security.  These threats are significant by themselves, but it is their combination that 
constitutes a radical challenge to our security.”
3 The statements clearly imply the necessity of 
measures directed at cross-border movements of migrants and drugs, with the goal of protecting 
Europe. 
 
                                                           
1 “Agreement Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders.”  Official Journal 
of the European Communities.  22.9.2000:14. 
2“Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985.”  Official Journal of the European 
Communities.  Brussels 22.9.2000. 
3 Summary of the Address by Mr. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy 
to the European Parliament.  Brussels, 18 June 2003.   
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Even prior to September 11, 2001, the ability of the EU to regulate its borders with the 
Central and Eastern European countries was deemed to be central to its internal security.   
Following the securitization rhetoric of EU officials, and especially member states’ leaders, the 
opening up of the Eastern bloc was seen as threatening to the security of the internal market 
primarily through labor immigration and crime.  One of the main reasons for the relatively low 
level of public approval of enlargement in the EU
4 is the fear of “flood” of immigrants from 
Central and Eastern Europe, who as cheap labor would displace local workers, thereby causing 
economic and social dislocations.
5  The rationale behind the fears from an influx of immigrants 
is not without merit: despite the economic growth of the past decade, the average wage 
differentials between the CEECs and current EU members still remain significant.    The number 
of migrants from the CEEC candidates, however, constitutes a relatively small portion of the 
overall third-country migration to the EU.
6  During the 1990s, the total number of legal 
immigrants from the candidate countries to the European Union was approximately 830,000, or 
15% from all legal immigrants from third-countries, and 0.2% of total EU residents.  With the 
exception of the refugees from the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the Central and Eastern 
European countries have not been a major source of immigration to the EU
7, and in fact, have 
fallen short of the expectations.  The prevailing pattern of migration from the East appears to be 
short- or medium-term, with the goal of short-term or seasonal work, and concentrated in Central 
Europe, primarily Austria and Germany. 
 
The European Commission has stipulated a transition period of maximum of seven years 
for the free movement of labor after the accession of the CEEC, the same restriction that the 
Iberian countries were subjected to.  A number of the current member states have decided to use 
this authority to restrict the intake of workers from the new member states, including Great 
Britain, Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Greece.
8  Many leaders, however, are 
recognizing that the policy of “zero immigration” is no longer sustainable in the European 
                                                           
4 The most recent Eurobarometer Survey shows that support for enlargement has dropped to 46% across the EU.  
Standard Eurobarometer 59.  Public Opinion in the European Union.  June 2003.  European Commission: Brussels, 
2003. 
5 For example, in 1997, an average of 57% of EU citizens thought that there were too many foreigners living in their 
country, with the highest rate in Greece with 84% and the lowest in Ireland – 17%.  Average of 66% thought that 
people coming from Central and Eastern Europe who wish to work in the EU should be accepted with restrictions, 
compared to 17% who thought that they should be accepted without restrictions, and 14% percent who thought that 
they should not be accepted at all.  European Commission.  Results of “Continuous Tracking” Surveys of European 
Union (September 1996 to January 1997).  http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eo/eo10/eo10gra.pdf. 
6 In 1999, the number of candidate country nationals who were legally employed in the EU was approximately 
290,000 out of total 5,280,000, or 6% of all foreign workers and 0.2% of the labor force. The majority of these 
workers – almost 70% - are in Germany and Austria, where they account for approximately 10% of all foreign 
workers, and 0.4 and 1.2% respectively of the total labor force.  The number of undocumented workers and migrants 
was estimated at approximately 600,000, most of whom engage in short-term work while abroad (“working 
tourists”) or cross-border trading (“trading tourists”).  The latter group are generally low-cost and flexible 
alternatives to local labor, in other words, the feared cheap labor competing with the local workers for scarce jobs, 
but some of them are engaged in areas already abandoned by the local labor, such as household tasks, care, and other 
personal services.  European Commission.  Information Note: The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of 
Enlargement.  Annex 1.  Brussels. (6 March 2001): 26-28. 
7 Ibid.  29-30. 
8 Travis, Alan.  “Expansion of EU Will Not Mean More Immigration,”  The Guardian.  6 June 2003   
www.guardian.co.uk. 
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context and the calls for the relaxation of immigration policies are growing.
9  The estimates of 
potential migration into the EU from the candidate countries varies widely, ranging from 
120,000 in the first year and declining to 50,000 over the first 10 years, to 380,000 in the first 
year and declining to 200,000 over ten years.
10 Not only the anticipated flood of immigrants has 
not materialized, but the CEECs are no longer expected to be a major source of immigration 
capable of meeting the demographic needs of European markets.  Hence, the issue of labor 
migration has been securitized despite being a largely non-existent threat.   
 
Despite the empirical reality, however, immigration remains a contested issue, allowing 
for the resurgence of right-wing parties and groups in some EU countries.  Anti-immigrant 
groups ranging from labor organizations to right-wing political parties and organizations, 
advocate more restrictive immigration policies, and are particularly opposed to the free 
movement of persons from some Central European countries after their accession.
11  S i n c e  
migration began to be linked to organized crime, terrorism, and later Islamic fundamentalism in 
the 1990s, the redefinition of migration as a security threat to the receiving countries has been 
politicized in the member states of the EU and become a mainstream political issue.  This is the 
result not only of the changes or costs of actual migration, but also of the growing tendencies to 
define socioeconomic and cultural problems as caused by migration.  While internal security, 
organized crime, welfare and unemployment, and preservation of identities were not necessarily 
the result of increased flow of immigrants, the issue has been successfully politicized by political 
parties, legitimating more restrictive external border policies.
12 
 
As a result of the collapsed economies, corruption, shaky judicial and law enforcement 
institutions in the Central and Eastern European countries, organized crime flourished and the 
potential for spillover into the EU was recognized early in the 1990s.  Although instances of 
crime by themselves present threats to individuals and not to society at large, rising crime rates 
are perceived as destabilizing to the domestic public order, and therefore, to societies as a whole.  
For instance, separate crime incidents committed by illegal immigrants in Italy provided 
opportunities for right-wing groups to argue for stricter immigration laws, giving them wide 
public exposure, and a rise in electoral fortunes.
13  Drug-trafficking and mafia-type organizations 
                                                           
9 For instance, last fall the state premier of the länder of Saxony called the transition period “unrealistic and 
unsustainable,” and that “Western Europeans’ fear that cheap laborers from eastern Europe will flood their countries 
and take away their jobs are mainly due to ignorance.”  “Premier Say Transition Periods Are Unrealistic,” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  4 Oct. 2001.  
http://www.faz.com. 
10European Commission.  Information Note: The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement.  Annex 
3.  Brussels. (6 March 2001): 34.  The main recipients of these immigrants would be Germany with 65%, followed 
by Austria with 12%.  “Will Western Europe Receive the Great Unwashed – One Day?” The Economist  2 May 
2001.  http://www.economist.com. 
11 Stratfor (Strategic Forecasting).  “The Return of ‘Fortress Europe?” 
http://www.stratfor.com/home/0110312230.htm. Jorg Haider, for example, has long opposed eastern enlargement 
arguing that “from the moment we open our borders, 200,000 people will come here, settle, and look for jobs,” and 
the equally telling statement that “enlargement is a declaration of war on all industrious and other hardworking 
people in Austria.  We demand that the question of enlargement be removed from the EU’s agenda,” made as late as 
1998.
11 Jörg Haider, qtd. in Lykke Friis, “Eastern Enlargement, Schengen, JHA and All That…,”1. 
12Boswell, Christina.  “The ‘External Dimension’ of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy,” International Affairs.  
79.3 (2003): 624. 
13“A Few Bad Apples,” The Economist.  13-19 Jan 2001: 50-51 
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were the most typical and expected potential risks of enlargement.
14  Organized crime and 
corruption, still problematic to accession countries and endemic to those countries left outside, 
are also cause for concern because of their possible spillover effects.  While the accession 
process helped stabilize the region, and therefore, lessen the threat to the current members of the 
EU, the fear persists that the porous borders may in fact bring those very same threats within the 
EU itself.
15   Thus, admitting new members who are economically lagging behind their Western 
counterparts, however, and whose institutions – despite the progress made during the 1990s – are 
still relatively unstable, is at times presented as a way of simply “importing” the problem into the 
EU.
16 The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, altered the security priorities by 
replacing illegal immigration and organized crime with international terrorism as the key security 
issue worldwide. 
 
 
Migration, Terrorism, and Enlargement 
 
Terrorism has become the main politically-related violent threat to the societies of the European 
Union.  International terrorism, along with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
failed states and organized crime are considered to be the main threats by the new European 
Security Strategy.
17  In response to the attacks in the United States, the EU accelerated the 
implementation of existing measures and introduced new ones for combating terrorism, 
including the adoption of common definition of terrorism, and an EU-wide arrest warrant, among 
others.  While Europeans were not unaccustomed to battling terrorism, prior to September 11 the 
efforts were focused primarily on terrorist groups who were active on a national level, and whose 
demands were concrete and negotiable.  In contrast, the emphasis has now shifted to 
international terrorism, with its global financial networks, communications and operations.
18 
 
David Carlton defines terrorism as “significant levels of violence perpetrated by 
politically-motivated sub-state actors who may or may not be to some degree sponsored by, but 
who will not normally be directly controlled by, sovereign states.”
19  It is also a threat that is 
rooted within western societies, thereby making possible the connection between open borders 
and immigration with facilitating terrorism.
20  Framing the issue of security in this way often 
implies that it is immigrants who are at the root of these problems, and tighter policing seems to 
                                                           
14The majority of the European public (51%) believes that with enlargement and the opening of borders, the fight 
against crime and drug trafficking will become more difficult.  European Commission.  Flash Eurobarometer 140: 
Enlargement of the European Union.  Brussels, March 2003, 64.  
15 53% percent of the public in the current member states believe that enlargement will make it more difficult to 
control illegal immigration.  In fact, this opinion is prevalent in twelve of the fifteen member states compared to ten 
in the previous survey.  European Commission.  Flash Eurobarometer 140 “Enlargement of the European Union.” 
Brussels, March 2003, 57.  
16 Friis, “Eastern Enlargement, Schengen, JHA, and All That,” 5. 
17 Summary of the Address by Mr. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy 
to the European Parliament.  Brussels, 18 June 2003.   
18 Cameron, Fraser, Cosijn, Hendrik, and Herrberg, Antje.  Tackling Terrorism and Dealing with Rogue States.  The 
European Policy Centre, EastWest Institute.  Brussels 31 October 2002. 
19 David Carlton, “Civil War, ‘Terrorism’ and Public Order in Europe,” in Identity, Migration, and the New Security 
Agenda in Europe.  Eds. Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre.167. 
20 Ibid. 25 
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be the proposed solution.  At least in part, this fear is again rooted in the ethnonational fear of 
foreigners and justifies support for repressive internal security practices.
21 
 
Even though, following Sept. 11, many European countries stepped up efforts to police 
their borders, throughout much of Central and Eastern Europe border authorities remain 
overwhelmed by a flood of immigrants from Middle East and Central Asia.  The eastern borders 
of the European Union and the Mediterranean are the main routes through which illegal 
immigrants seek entry into the EU.  The eastern rim of the candidate states in particular, which 
includes Slovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania – are points of entry for many refugees or 
illegal immigrants from countries long considered to be hotbeds of militant extremism, such as 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
22 The eastern route appears to be an easy option for anyone with 
terrorist intentions to enter Western Europe.  According to intelligence officials’ accounts 
published in the press, there is evidence that entering the EU through CEECs has been tested by 
Al Qaeda and other groups.
23  Not surprisingly, the threat raises concerns among authorities, and 
is reflected among the public’s fears as well, influencing its overall opinion on the upcoming 
enlargement. Some Eastern European leaders have urged the CEECs to focus on combating 
illegal immigration, drug-trafficking, money laundering, and corruption, as part of their anti-
terrorism efforts.  Recognizing that the CEECs are a region of transit, Lithuanian President 
Valdas Adamkus, for example, has argued that “our cooperation can be especially effective in 
shutting down the channels that feed terrorist networks.“
24 
 
The reasons for suspected terrorists to choose one of the CEECs as a transit route to 
Western Europe are not new: insufficient number of border guards, dilapidated infrastructure, 
and corruption.  For those intent on doing so, there is little to stop them from crossing the borders 
illegally; those who are caught usually demand asylum, giving them the right to remain for six 
months in unguarded camps, which become their launching pads for the journey westward.
25  In 
countries other than the candidates, such as Albania and Kosovo, where the institutions of the 
state have yet to be fully consolidated, crime networks appear to be hard to break up and in some 
cases may work together with Islamic extremists.
26 
 
 
 
 
The Schengen Acquis and its Implementation by the Candidate Countries 
 
The fear of the expected mass influx of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe has been 
one of the main reasons for incorporating the Schengen acquis in the Amsterdam Treaty.  The 
                                                           
21 Ole Waever and Bary Buzan, unpublished manuscript. December 2000, 426-7.  
22 “Where Migrant’s Journey’s Began, and How They Are Faring In the European Squeeze,”  New York Times 28 
Apr 2002, www.nytimes.com; Rick Jervis, Christopher Cooper, and Gary Fields, “Stream of Refugees Crossing Into 
Europe May Include Terrorists,” Wall Street Journal 5 Jul 2002.  www.wsj.com. 
23 Ibid. 
24 “Lithuanian President Calls For Reinforced Measures To Combat Terrorism,”  BBC Monitoring Former Soviet 
Union, 6 Nov 2001 www.bbc.com 
25 Ibid. 
26 “They Are On Both Sides of the Pond; Europe’s Hunt for Al Qaeda.” The Economist.  2002.   
www.economist.com   7 
Europeanization of policies in this area, and particularly the partial communitarization of the 
Justice and Home Affairs pillar, enabled the member states to reinforce their restrictive policies 
and law-enforcement approach to immigration and to impose their security agenda on the 
candidates for enlargement as well.
27  The Union’s position has been that by “the date of 
accession, acceding countries will need to have achieved a high level of border control, even 
though certain special arrangements such as shared infrastructure and equipment or joint patrols 
could be envisaged.”
28 Thus, it is hardly surprising that the negotiations on this part of the acquis 
received much attention and were considered critical in the accession process as a whole.  Given 
the relative lack of technology, expertise, and experience the CEECs have in the area of border 
control, however, the emphasis has shifted to the actual capacity of the candidates to implement 
the  acquis.  While their shortcomings have been recognized, nonetheless, the ability of the 
accession countries to implement the acquis and provide effective border control for the new 
external borders of the Union has become a preset condition for their entry into the Union.
29 
   
It has been well-documented that the state of the border control institutions of the CEECs 
has much to be desired.  The pressure from the EU has prompted the candidates to pass the 
necessary legislative framework for implementing the provisions and standards required by the 
acquis, which range from the reorganization of border patrols and police forces to establishing 
visa requirements and implementing changes to the criminal code, among others.  The existing 
problems are mainly due to the lack of coherent policies among the authorities responsible for 
border control, lack of autonomy of the border guards, and inadequate equipment, infrastructure, 
and compensation for the border guards.
30  Furthermore, the provisions and standards of the 
acquis continued to change as more legislation was being adopted at the European Union level, 
thereby making it ever harder for the candidates to keep up with the fast-moving legislative 
target.  While the volume of legislation increases, there is not one single model of border 
controls across the EU, or even clear definitions of crimes that the candidates are expected to 
fight, such as human trafficking.  In addition, the European Union’s emphasis has been on 
effective border controls, the implications of the new external borders for the candidate’s 
relations with their neighboring countries have been left largely unresolved.  The emphasis on 
law enforcement also suggests that human rights are taking back seat to the importance of 
repressive measures.  In Central and Eastern Europe, where human rights norms are still being 
forged, this may result in negative outcomes with regards to another aspect of border controls, 
such as data gathering and handling asylum applications.
31   
 
In tandem with the EU member states, all thirteen candidates for membership agreed to 
full solidarity with the United States in its war on terrorism.  That meant measures, such as 
cooperation in intelligence gathering and sharing experience in training anti-terror forces and 
                                                           
 
27 See Theodora Kostakopoulou, “The ‘Protective Union’: Change and Continuity in Migration Law and Policy in 
Post-Amsterdam Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies.  38.3 (2000): 497-518. 
28 Strategy Paper 28.  www.europa.eu.int 
29 Mitsilegas, Valsamis.  “The Implementation of the EU Acquis on Illegal Immigration by the Candidate Countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe: Challenges and Contradictions,”  Journal of Ethnic and Migration  Studies.  28.4 
(2002): 668. 
30 Mitsilegas 675. 
31 Mitsilegas 677. 
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providing emergency medical services.    The United States has also trained court, customs and 
immigration officials in the CEECs.
32  There is a clear necessity for continued close cooperation 
with the accession countries most of which do not have experience to combat terrorism or the 
adequate means to monitor and police organized crime.  The fight against terrorism takes place 
through the police and judicial cooperation, but it has become a central component of the 
strategic concepts of military alliances, such as NATO, and the EU’s security and defense 
structures.  The enlargement of both of these institutions to include a number of Central and 
Eastern European is intended to extend the zone of stability as the best guarantee against security 
threats, including terrorist attacks. 
 
 
European Security after September 11th  
 
Traditionally associated with the defense of the territorial state from external threats, military 
security remains a core security concept.  While mutual military threats are virtually non-existent 
in the European Union as well as North America, parts of the Old Continent’s periphery remain 
prone to instability.  The wars in the former Yugoslavia and the resultant influx of refugees into 
the West brought to the fore the realization that Europe’s security was indivisible.  The concept 
has also expanded to include non-military threats to the ability of governments to maintain 
themselves, such as migration or rival ideologies.
33This section will take a brief look at the 
impact of enlargement on the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.  It will 
argue that the convergence between old and new members’ foreign and security policy behavior 
is likely to increase as the socialization effect of EU governance on the accession countries 
grows.  Also, the accession of the Central and Eastern Europeans may contribute to the making 
of a more Atlanticist EU foreign policy as well as enhance the “eastern dimension” of its external 
action, but it will also strengthen Europe’s voice as a global actor. 
 
 
Common Foreign and Security Policy After Iraq 
 
In the aftermath of September 11 and the subsequent “war on terror” waged by the United States, 
the area of military security once again came to the spotlight.  The invasion of Iraq brought about 
the most significant rift in transatlantic relations since World War II, simultaneously 
undermining the credibility of the United Nations, NATO, and the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.  The disarray, which surrounded the latter, indicated a lack of consensus on 
fundamental issues of foreign and security policy among the member states, perhaps the most 
important of which was on the reason d’etre for Europe’s global role.  In this context, it can be 
argued that military security was less about the defense of sovereign, territorial states, than about 
Europe’s (meaning the EU’s) ability to be a substantive foreign policy and security actor in the 
world, especially vis-à-vis the United States.  In other words, multilateralism as embodied in fora 
such as the UN Security Council and NATO, and ultimately, the EU’s role as a global actor were 
                                                           
32 “EU/US: September 11 Attacks Forge Closer Police and Judicial Links.” European Report, Europe Information 
Service, 10 Oct 2001, p. 518. 
33Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde.  Security: A New Framework for Analysis.  Boulder and London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998: 50. 
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presented as being at stake.  International law as implied by these organizations was also among 
the principles which were seen as threatened by the intent of the United States to “go it alone,” 
and thereby, the necessity for a European alternative.  The inability of the member states to take 
action following declarations even led to questioning the future of European integration in the 
areas of foreign and security policies, and ultimately, Europe’s political future.  Hence, the 
inability of the EU to achieve a consensus over Iraq could be portrayed as having implications 
not only for the capacity of the EU to influence world events, but also for the success of the 
integration process itself.
34  
  
The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union came into being with 
the Maastricht Treaty as a pillar in the EU structure.  While the goals for the CFSP are ambitious 
indeed,
35 their practical attainment has been far less successful.  As with all common policies of 
the EU, which are decided by unanimity, decision-making, institutional make-up, and ultimately, 
national interests of the member states are all factors that have contributed to the fact that the 
CFSP is still considered to be in its “embryonic” form.  If, however, foreign policy is seen more 
than just the pursuit of narrow national interests, it can be argued that the CFSP has moved well 
beyond the “coordination” implied in the treaty provisions.  Foreign policy has long become part 
of the integration process, where EPC/CFSP officials have conformed to the rules of precedent 
even prior to their formal treaty legalization, thereby making unilateral foreign policy 
declarations the exception rather than the rule.
36  The intergovernmental bargaining that takes 
place in CFSP decision-making inevitably leads to a change the member states’ interests.  In 
other words, their foreign policy interests and objectives emerge as a result of the interaction at 
the domestic, national, and European levels, whereby the member states gradually become 
socialized into a shared community of values.
37  
   
The European Security and Defense Policy is a central part of the CFSP in order to 
“implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a 
common defense policy.”
38The Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999 of forming a rapid reaction force 
of 60,000 capable of being deployed within 60 days and able to remain in the field for up to a 
year was declared operational at the Laeken Summit in December 2001.  The rapid reaction force 
is intended to handle primarily the “Petersberg’s Tasks,” which include humanitarian and rescue 
tasks, peace-keeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis management.  The EU member states 
will also provide up to 5,000 police officers for international crisis missions.  The agreement on 
“Berlin plus”, which was finalized in December 2002, assured access to NATO planning, assets 
                                                           
34See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde.  Security: A New Framework for Analysis.  Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998: 187.  
35The Treaty on the European Union lists the objectives as follows: “to safeguard common values, fundamental 
interests, and independence of the EU; to strengthen the security of the EU and its member states in all ways; to 
preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as 
the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; to promote international cooperation; 
and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”  Treaty on the European Union.  Title V Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy.  Article 
J.1.    
36White, Brian.  “The European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis.”  European Journal of International Relations  
5.1 (1999): 37-66. 
37Sjursen, Helene.  Enlargement and the Common Foreign and External Policy: Transforming the EU’s External 
Policy?” ARENA Working Paper WP 98/18.  www.arena.uio.no.  
38 Treaty on European Union 1992.   10  
and capabilities for the EU initiative, thereby giving it an impetus for actual implementation.  As 
the Petersberg Tasks suggest, territorial defense is not intended as an objective for the the EU’s 
RRF.  In addition, officials within the EU and NATO, have taken pains to point out that “there 
will be no standing European force.”
39Hence, conflict prevention and crisis management are the 
cornerstone of the security paradigm underpinning the pursuit of European civilian and military 
security capabilities.  Of particular interest in the following years will be the practical 
implementation of the “division of labor” and geographic scope between the EU’s rapid reaction 
force and the one to be created by NATO.   
 
 
The Accession Countries and European Foreign and Security Policies 
 
The accession countries played a small part in the debacle of EU’s CFSP over the most recent 
Iraqi crisis.  In two separately published letters, virtually all candidates from Central and Eastern 
Europe expressed their support for the United States, thereby prompting a terse reaction from 
President Jacques Chirac, and alternatively, the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
division of the continent into “old” vs. “new Europe.”  President Chirac essentially told the 
candidates that their actions had jeopardized their chances of joining the Union and more loyalty 
to the European family was expected of them.  President Chirac’s admonition clearly suggested a 
“kinship” duty of the accession countries toward their future partners in the EU. Chirac’s 
statement echoed the argument that the main justification for developing European defense 
capabilities within the EU rather than NATO was that member states would arguably be more 
motivated to invest efforts in the name of Europe than NATO.
40  Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, 
on the other hand, suggested that the dispute over Iraq was in essence about protecting 
“European sovereignty” and that the actions taken now would determine the development of 
Europe over the next 10 to 15 years.
41  Sovereignty as a concept is preserved almost entirely for 
the territorial state and implies that there is no international “actor above the state that can 
compel it act in specific ways.”
42 In this particular context, it arguably refers to the ability of the 
EU to formulate its positions and take action independently of the United States, thereby 
justifying the French and German positions as acting in the name of Europe’s sovereignty.  The 
supposition that the developments surrounding the crisis with Iraq will have an impact on the 
evolution of the European project suggests that that course and success of European integration 
was at stake.  By taking a stand against the position of France and Germany, the two member 
states who have traditionally charted the course of integration, and in support of the United 
States, the CEECs could thereby be seen as putting in peril the future of the integration process.   
 
                                                           
39 General George Robertson, Speech by NATO Secretary, at the presentation of the Chesney Gold Medal to 
Baroness Thatcher, Royal United Services Institute, London, 1 March 2001. qtd. Gartner, Heinz.  “European 
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International Studies Association, Portland, OR.  25 February – March 1, 2003. 
40Crow, Brian. “A Common European Foreign Policy After Iraq?”  International Affairs  79.3 (2003): 539.  
41 Vinocur, John.  “News Analysis: A Bid Unhappy Family.”  International Herald Tribune  19 February 2003.  
www.iht.com 
42 Baylis, John and Smith, Steve.  The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations.  
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The pending expansion of NATO to include in its ranks most of the same countries which 
will be joining the EU is an issue that that has contributed to the discussion over the future role 
of the CEECs in the transatlantic relationship.  The new members are clearly more Atlanticist in 
their foreign policies and in favor of maintaining close ties with the United States.  This is partly 
due to geography and recent history, among other factors: in the absence of viable security 
alternative from the European Union and in view of the proximity of Russia, the United States 
clearly represents a security actor that can deliver protection.
43 Poland, the largest of the 
accession countries, is striving to position itself as part of the bridge between the United States 
and “old Europe,” which the rest of the new members would be a part of.  Poland sent 200 troops 
to fight in Iraq and it is set to oversee one of the four sectors in Iraq is to be divided.  Bulgaria 
and Romania, set to join NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007, let their bases be used as staging 
posts and are eager to have the United States set permanent military bases in their territories.  In 
view of the proximity of the Middle East and Central Asia to the southeastern periphery of 
Europe, such a move seems justifiable strategically, but may come at the expense of closing 
down some bases in Germany.
44   
 
This cooperation with the United States has been interpreted as providing the basis for 
deepening the rift between the “old Europe” and the United States, as well as between the two 
“Europes.”  This view is supported by the intended defense cooperation between Germany, 
France, Belgium, and Luxemburg through forming a “core” group for conducting operations in 
which other members may not want to join.  The accession countries tend to view suspiciously 
such initiatives suspiciously as they would undoubtedly like to participate the decision-making of 
the EU in all issue areas on an equal footing.  In addition, the increased membership will 
undoubtedly move the center of gravity in the EU away from France in particular, thereby 
helping to set a less counterbalancing agenda.   
 
The support of the new members, such as Poland, however, may also help bridge the gap 
between the United States and Europe by drawing more NATO countries in the “coalitions of the 
willing,” which seem to be the preferred approach by the US.
45  The new members are also likely 
to bring their own traditions, experiences, and interests to the intergovernmental politics of the 
ESDP, and CFSP in general.  Although some of them do have specialized forces, such as the 
nuclear decontamination units of the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, and have engaged in 
cooperation, such as the Baltic battalion, few of them have troops sufficiently well-trained to 
engage in high intensity conflicts.
46    
 
 
The Impact of Enlargement on the Scope and Effectiveness of CFSP 
 
Traditional foreign policy analysis would suggest that the eastern enlargement would 
inevitably have a negative effect on the functioning and content of the nascent CFSP.  First, it 
                                                           
43 Baun, Michael.  “EU Intergovernmental Politics After Enlargement.” 
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www.economist.com. 
45 Ibid. 
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The European Policy Centre.  EastWest Institute.  10 March 2003. 
   12  
would be more difficult to develop coherent foreign policy based on shared interests and 
objectives among potentially twenty-seven member states than among fifteen.  The range of 
issues that the new members will likely be diverse, thereby further testing the institutional 
framework of CFSP.  On the other hand, if European foreign policy is viewed in a framework 
that allows for interaction and mutual influence between the national and European levels, then 
the outcome may be different, particularly in the long term as the socialization of the new 
members into the EU’s culture of governance. 
 
Second, extending the borders further to the East and South will bring new issues to the 
fore, among which security is likely to be the most salient one.  At the beginning of the new 
century, the most pressing security concerns have shifted from Europe’s center to its periphery, 
and further to the Middle East and Central Asia.  The potential for a renewed instability in the 
Western Balkans remains primarily an European concern, especially with the United States 
focused on the war on terror and increasingly less interested in the Balkans.  As the European 
Union prepares to take over the peace-keeping operations in Bosnia, having already taken charge 
of the NATO mission in Macedonia in March 2003, and the inauguration of the European Union 
Police Mission in Bosnia in January 2003, one might ask the extent to which the Western 
Balkans are an area of external policy for the EU.   
 
In addition to diverse foreign policy interests, an increased membership will mean 
different neighbors for the EU, and thus new relations with third states.  After enlargement, the 
EU will border Ukraine and Russia, and contain Kaliningrad as a Russian enclave between 
Poland and Lithuania.  Russia has not objected to the eastern enlargement and having the states 
of Central and Eastern Europe as EU members will inevitably enhance the relations with Russia, 
which considers itself a great European power.  Thus, the “eastern dimension” of EU’s external 
policy is likely to be accentuated, as the new members led by Poland will push for policies aimed 
at stabilizing the new external border of the Union, particularly the relations with Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova, and Russia.  Hungary and Slovenia, along with eventual members Bulgaria 
and Romania would presumably be interested in stabilizing the Balkans, for example.  The new 
members would also join the current member states in their emphasis of a specific neighboring 
geographic area as well as the emergence of sub-regional blocks.
47  While it is clear that 
enlargement will bring considerable benefits to the Central and Eastern European states, 
including security, it will inevitably draw a new line of division.  In contrast to more internal-
security minded current member states, because of their long-standing economic, social, cultural, 
and political linkages with their neighbors to the east, the new members are likely to have a 
strong interest in ensuring that the EU’s new borders do not become the new dividing line 
between the zone of peace, stability, and prosperity from the rest of the continent.
48   
 
The European Union has proven itself as a capable civilian actor and the strong attraction 
of its social model, and the values and principles it embodies are perhaps best exemplified by the 
successful political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe.  The domestic 
structures of the current member states of the European Union have experienced an ever-growing 
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degree of Europeanization as a result of decades of integration.
49  In parallel to this process of 
transference of European policy-making in domestic politics, the degree of integration achieved 
so far in Europe can be explained at least in part by the shared common purposes and values, 
acceptance of the rule of law and the authority of common institutions, and behaving in other 
aspects as if bound by formal legal rules.  Similarly, the prospect for EU membership for 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe placed the Union in a very strong position to 
influence their internal politics.  Taking advantage of the desirability of EU membership, the 
Union has used its influence vigorously and across the board in pressuring these countries into 
implementing market policies, transparency in the bureaucratic and political systems, and 
democratic human rights regimes.  The implementation of the policies has led to a degree of 
internalization of the principles, norms and values of liberal democracy prevalent in the 
European Union.  The conditionality of accession has been the primary instrument through 
which the candidate countries are becoming more like the current member states. Thus, 
enlargement involves both the formal extension of supranational institutions to the applicant 
states but also their socialization into a structure of governance, which would guide their 
behavior in the long term.    It can be expected that much like the increasing influence of 
Brussels over the conduct of domestic policies and politics of the current members, the foreign 
policy interests of the prospective new members are likely to alter as a result of the interaction of 
the domestic, national, and European.  In the long run, although the content of CFSP in a wider 
Europe may change, cooperation in this area is likely to continue as part of the broader process 
of Europeanization and socialization. 
 
Intergovernmental politics and decision-making, however, are the essence of common 
policies, such as the CFSP.  In the short-term, it has been predicted that following enlargement, 
the pattern of decision-making in the European Union will be based upon various issue-based, 
shifting coalitions.  Member states are likely to form alliances with others when their interests on 
a particular issue converge, rather than establishing permanent power bloc coalitions.
50  These 
flexible and shifting coalitions are likely to depend on the issues at hand and reflect structural 
cleavages, such as geography, wealth, and size, among others.  In this case, the enlargement is 
unlikely to change significantly the intergovernmental bargaining over CFSP, but will rather 
reinforce existing trends.
51  It should also be emphasized that having a common European 
foreign and security policies does not entail their existence in lieu of the national foreign and 
security policies of the member states.  Having been under Soviet domination for over four 
decades, the Central and Eastern European countries are keen on preserving their sovereignty in 
foreign policy, and thus, would resist pressures to conform to any common European foreign 
policy that runs counter to their national interests; to them full membership in the Union would 
entail precisely that, especially in the area of foreign and security policies.  That is why they are 
likely to resist efforts by the United Kingdom to concentrate more power in foreign and security 
policy making into hands of the big member states, which, save Poland, none of the new 
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members are.  Again, in view of the fact that intergovernmental politics in the European Union 
involves not just national governments of member states and their perceived national interests, 
but also rules, norms, and values that are part of the supranational governance of the Union, it is 
likely that these will have a socializing effect on the new member states and, in time, transform 
the nature of their interests.  Their accession may, in fact, speed up the process toward sharing 
diplomatic and other facilities in third countries.  With the exception of Poland, the accession 
countries are relatively small and with limited resources.  The challenge that may arise in this 
area – inherent to the current membership as well – is overcoming the national mentality of 
diplomats and the relative inexperience with Union’s machinery.
52 
 
The socialization effect of being gradually phased in EU governance and the convergence 
of interests in general is evident on a number of issues.  While their siding with the United States 
in the crisis with Iraq brought about references to the CEECs as the “Trojan horse” for the US in 
the EU, the record shows that most of these states routinely vote with the EU in other multilateral 
bodies, such as the UN, and in support of the Kyoto Protocol and non-proliferation, among 
others.  Strongly multilateralist in the conduct of international relations, their positions on a 
number of foreign policy issues coincide with those of the Europeans.  Their voting patterns are 
a sign that they are becoming increasingly socialized into the EU’s way of conducting business 
as they come nearer to membership.
53 Hence, while the eastern enlargement will help thwart the 
evolution of the EU as a counterweight to the United States on principle, it will also help create a 
stronger Europe with a common voice in the international scene. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The redefinition of Europe in institutional terms through the prospects for EU and NATO 
enlargements have contributed to stabilizing parts of Eastern Europe, which were undergoing 
difficult political and economic transformations, some amid a process of nation-building as well.  
The peace, stability, and prosperity that Europe’s enlargements sought to ensure, however, may 
be undermined with the shifting of the external borders on the new EU further east and the strong 
emphasis on restrictive border control policies.  This contradiction has been well and frequently 
noted by a number of scholars, but so far has had little policy, albeit substantial political effect in 
the domestic politics of the member states. 
 
The enlargement of the European Union is likely to enhance its presence on the global 
scene.  While it has proved its capabilities as a civilian power and has emerged as an important 
regional security actor, its global role in the foreign and security policy field remains unclear.  
Although the foundations for common policies in this area exist, without political will, value 
convergence, and institutionalization, the European Union can hardly hope to play the same role 
as it does in other areas or become a viable alternative to an increasingly unilateralist United 
States.  In a global security environment characterized by insecurity and risks, there is a 
necessity for a comprehensive approach to security problems, including addressing their root 
causes.  An enlarged and stronger EU of pan-European proportions can play this role, extend the 
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zone of stability to the neighboring regions, and contribute to the strengthening of international 
order.  The realization of this potential security role, however, rests with the political will of its 
member states.     
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